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Consequences of Heirs' Misconduct:
Moving from Rules to Discretion
ANNE-MARIE RHODES*
INTRODUCTION
Disposing of property at the owner's death can be a daunting and
complex task today. There are federal and state tax concerns, probate court
filings, and non-probate financial institution forms to complete.' Blackstone
would be amazed at the paper generated, the number of institutional players
involved in the process, and probably by the number of decedents who have
property to be distributed.2 But he would not be amazed at the primary
takers.3 The tables of heirship in the main have changed little in the two and
a half centuries since his Commentaries appeared.4 The circle of takers still
revolves around spouse and family members: children, parents and siblings.
While the basic structure of primary takers has changed little since
Blackstone, statutes have slowly expanded the number of those allowed in the
circle, essentially by adding adjectives to the original descriptives. Adopted
and non-marital children are two obvious examples where the common law
* Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago School of Law, J.D. Harvard University. I thank
the members of the OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW for their invitation to participate in the
"Frontiers of Estate Planning: Changing Laws for Changing Times" symposium. I am especially grateful
to Kristin Schultz and Professor John Martin for their gracious hospitality. I also thank Elizabeth Seward,
Loyola University Chicago School of Law, J.D. 2007, for her thorough and cheerful research assistance.
All errors and omissions are mine alone. This essay is a modestly revised version of my presentation at the
symposium on March 23, 2007.
1. The complexity of the United States transfer tax system seems limitless. Even an estate that has
successfully navigated the questions of inclusion of assets in the gross estate, determined its eligibility for
various deductions, and then calculated its estate tax, can find that the actual payment of tax itself raises
complex and interrelated tax issues. See Wendy C. Gerzog, Equitable Apportionment: Recent Cases and
Continuing Trends, 41 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 671 (Winter 2007).
2. William Blackstone (1723-1780) introduced the study of English Law at Oxford University,
publishing his lectures from 1765-1769 as the four-volume COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND.
3. At common law, of course, a surviving spouse was not an heir of the decedent spouse. Rather,
the surviving spouse was provided for through either the dower or curtesy interest. Today this difference
has generally disappeared with a surviving spouse now being categorized and included as an heir. The
references to heirs and the tables of heirship comprehend this current, more inclusive meaning.
4. Some commentators have characterized the shift to include a surviving spouse as an heir as
"[o]ne of the great transforming trends that has marked the development of Western family law over the
past two centuries...." MARYANN GLENDON, THETRANSFORMATIONOFFAMILY LAW: STATE, LAW, AND
FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE 238 (1989). I do not dispute this family law
characterization. My purpose in this paper is much more limited: merely to focus on who the statutory law
provides for at the decedent's death in the distribution of the decedent's property, not the size or extent of
the benefit.
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norm of family for inheritance purposes has evolved. 5 Reproductive
technology today presents challenges, in ways unthinkable to Blackstone, to
further expand the embrace of inheritance.6 These demands on inheritance,
where certainty and stability are traditionally prized, lead some to say enough,
"no-more-heirs.,7
Newton's third law of motion, simplified, is that for every action there is
an equal and opposite reaction. As the number of those who may be
considered heirs increases, on the one hand, there naturally may emerge an
interest in statutory disinheritance, on the other hand. Presumptive heirs may
lose their status because of their misconduct. The slayer statute is the most
commonly enacted statute that strips heirship status.8 Modem research into
the destructive societal and individual consequences of dysfunctional families
heightens awareness of the importance of behavior, especially with respect to
its impact on children.9 Best interests of a child may require the child's
removal from the family when the conduct of the family is toxic. When an
heir's behavior relative to the decedent is inconsistent with societal
expectations, there may be a collective demand for an "heir-no-more."1 °
5. See THOMAS E. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS §§ 22-23 at 81-92 (2d ed. 1953)
for a summary of the historical legal shift; see also Patricia G. Roberts, Adopted and Nonmarital
Children-Exploring the 1990 Uniform Probate Code's Intestacy and Class Gift Provisions, 32 REAL
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 539 (Winter 1998). For a more current view of changing norms, see Susan N. Gary,
Adapting Intestacy Laws to Changing Families, 18 LAw & INEQ. 1 (2000).
6. See Woodward v. Comm'rof Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257 (Mass. 2002), determining that the twin
girls posthumously conceived by the decedent's wife were the intestate heirs of the decedent whose frozen
sperm was used. See also Katheleen R. Guzman, Property, Progeny, Body Part: Assisted Reproduction
and the Transfer of Wealth, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 193 (1997).
7. Consider Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act §4(b), 9B U.L.A. 161 (1998);
VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158(A)(3) (West 2007); see also Ronald Chester, Freezing the Heir Apparent: A
Dialogue on Postmortem Conception, Parental Responsibility, and Inheritance, 33 HOUS. L. REV. 967
(1996); Kristine S. Knaplund, Postmortem Conception and a Father's Last Will, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 91
(2004).
8. See discussion infra at notes 20-33.
9. For a particularly poignant discussion of the impact of abuse and neglect on children, see
RICHARD J. GE.lES, THE BOOK OF DAVID: How PRESERVING FAMInIS CAN COST CHILDREN'S LIVES 148
(1996) ("If we have learned anything in the past thirty years, it is that we cannot achieve the delicate
balance between keeping abused children safe and keeping them with their parents."); see also ELIZABETH
BARTHOLET, NOBODY'S CHILDREN (1999), and Elizabeth Bartholet, The Challenge of Children's Rights
Advocacy: Problems and Progress in the Area of ChildAbuse and Neglect, 3 WHI'riERJ. CHILD&FAMILY
ADvoc. 215 (2004). Removing children from abusive environments presents new and difficult questions
of alternative placements. See Sasha Coupet, Swimming Upstream Against the Great Adoption Tide:
Making the Case For 'Impermanence,' 34 CAP. U. L. REV. 405 (2005).
10. See discussion infra at notes 38-47. Individual demands may well precede collective demands.
See Brian Donohue, Victory for an Absentee Father, STAR LEDGER, (Newark, N.J.), July 26, 2006, at 1
(reporting that ajudge had determined that Ruben Martinez was entitled to share in his deceased daughter's
estate, even though he had little contact with her during life, over the strenuous objections of the mother,
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This expansion and contraction of the universe of heirs, who's in and
who's out, raises some fundamental questions about the role of the legal
system in transferring property from the decedent to others. Who should
decide who takes the property and how much? Does the decedent's intent
matter? Is there a societal interest at stake? What is the standard to determine
the taker under the circumstances, and which circumstances? It is a classic
pull as the legal system matures from objective rules within a fairly
homogenous society to subjective norms across an economically and
culturally diverse society.
This paper will examine the current statutory bars to inheritance of a
presumptive heir in the United States, primarily from the perspectives of the
statutory conduct required, the theory underlying the statute (whether
decedent's intent or public policy), and the consequences on inheritance of
that conduct. Legislatures have not moved boldly in this area, perhaps
reflecting a general reluctance to wade too far into family matters, allowing
a zone of privacy for the day to day details of family affairs." This
recognition of legislative limits may proceed from notions of individual
autonomy and liberty in consensual matters, or more pragmatically, from
concerns about institutional efficiency. We know that every family has issues,
and we just don't want to go there. A third possibility is the traditional
perspective that the criminal code, not the probate code, is the proper venue
for such concerns about misconduct. 2
And yet as much as the inheritance system would prefer not to deal with
such issues, human conduct is not always benign. It can careen across the
lines of acceptable conduct, even if those lines are repositioned over time. In
crossing those lines, the political and judicial processes may be involved and
then, reluctantly or otherwise, they are forced to act. How the legal system
responds to such conduct in the sphere of an individual's inheritance provides
a current reflection on the balance between an individual's and society's views
of control over property, and more specifically, on the balance between a
decedent's particular intent and society's collective judgment of public policy
in light of the misconduct. It is the thesis of this paper that the legislative
Rosa Rogiers, who vowed to lobby the New Jersey legislature for a change in law to bar abandoning parents
from inheriting).
11. See, e.g., Linda Kelly Hill, No-Fault Death: Wedding Inheritance Rights to Family Values, 94
KY. L.J. 319, 322, 348-54 (2005-06) (forcefully advocating for the abolition of all statutes that would deny
a surviving spouse inheritance rights based on emotional harms, such as bigamy, adultery, abandonment
and so forth premised on the "proper deference to the right of marital privacy"); but see Frances Foster,
Towards a Behavior-Based Model of Inheritance?: The Chinese Experiment, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 77
(1998) (describing a system that specifically considers behavior, good and bad, in inheritance).
12. "It is now well accepted that the matter dealt with is not exclusively criminal in nature but is also
a proper matter for probate courts." UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-803, comment (1990).
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reluctance to bar inheritance based on misconduct continues and that the
existing disinheritance statutes reflect a confusion of purpose and an
ambiguity of theory. A handful of newer disinheritance statutes may be
charting a new course by moving beyond the historic tradition of enacting an
objective rule that covers all cases to instead granting a judge discretion to
custom tailor a result based on the facts of the particular case. This nascent
recognition of the limits of legislative pronouncements in discrete misconduct
cases fits within the context of succession law reform that similarly adopts a
more nuanced approach to modem day inheritance, where nontraditional
families may outnumber traditional ones, and property transfers at death no
longer pass primarily through the probate process.
Part I considers the traditional adultery and murder bars to inheritance,
and examines their underlying theories and the statutory consequences of the
misconduct. Part II moves to the newer statutory bars of abandonment and
abuse and similarly examines their theories and consequences. Part I
considers the limits of legislative pronouncements on misconduct in the larger
context of succession law reform.
II. STATUTORY BARS TO INHERITANCE: ADULTERY AND SLAYER STATUTES
A. Adultery
One of the earliest statutory bars to inheritance in the common law
system was the Statute of Westminster II in 1285 that barred a woman from
dower if she had abandoned her husband and lived in an adulterous
relationship with another. 13 In our early history, this common law statutory
bar was adopted, expressly or by implication, in a number of jurisdictions in
the United States.' 4 As time moved on, so did the public policy perception of
such conduct as a bar to inheritance. Today there are five states that
specifically address inheritance in some measure by an adulterous spouse.' 5
Each of these jurisdictions provides a nondiscretionary automatic bar to
inheriting the designated property by the adulterous spouse, but the bar is soft
in all five states. If the husband and wife reconcile and resume living
together, then the prior adultery does not bar the inheritance in Kentucky and
Missouri.' 6 Both North Carolina and Ohio provide an escape from the
disinheritance if the aggrieved party condones the adulterous relationship,'"
13. STATUTE OF WESTMINSTER II, 13 EDW. I, c.34 (1285).
14. See THOMAS E. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS, § 37, at 148-50 (2d ed. 1953).
15. See IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-2-14 (West 2007); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 392.090 (West 2007);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 474.140 (West 2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31 A- 1 (2) (West 2007); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 4123.59 (West 2007).
16. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 392.090(2) (West 2007); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 474.140 (West 2007).
17. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 3 1A-1 (2) (West 2007); OHmo REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.59 (West 2007).
[Vol. 33
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while Indiana requires that the adulterous relationship continue until the
decedent spouse's death. 8
Though these statutes continue to recognize and provide for the historic
bar to inheritance because of spousal misconduct, the statutes also allow the
parties themselves, by their subsequent intentional conduct, effectively to
reinstate inheritance. The Scarlet Letter can be removed by the individuals
involved, suggesting that the underlying theory of adultery as disinheriting
conduct today is no longer society's unmovable presumed intent of the
presumably aggrieved decedent; rather it is this decedent's particular intent.
If the spouse's subsequent actions do not corroborate the societal presumed
intent, then that collective judgment yields to the intent inferred from the
individual's particular actions.
The limited number of jurisdictions that have a specific statute on
adultery today also supports the significance of the decedent's intent theory,
as opposed to a collective public policy against such conduct. No fault
divorce is a common process today and, for those marriages that cannot
survive adultery, the legal relationship can be undone. 9 As inheritance is
based on spousal status, once undone, the inheritance disappears completely.
B. Slayer Statutes
All jurisdictions in the United States address inheritance by the
decedent's slayer, with the overwhelming majority, 48 of 51, doing so by
statute.2" The remaining three do so by case law.2 Although murderous heirs
18. IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-2-14 (West 2007).
19. "By 1985, all states had adopted some form of no-fault divorce, either by designating a no-fault
ground as the exclusive basis for divorce or by adding such a provision to existing fault grounds." JOHN
DEWrrr GREGORY, ET AL., UNDERSTANDING FAMILY LAW 238 (3d ed. 2005).
20. See ALA. CODE § 43-8-253 (2007); ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.803 (2007); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 14-2803 (2007); ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-11-204 (West 2007); CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 250-258 (West 2007);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-803 (West 2007); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-447 (West 2007); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 2322 (2007); D.C. CODE § 19-320 (2007); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.802 (West 2007);
GA. CODE ANN. § 53-1-5 (West 2007); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 560:2-803 LexisNexis 2007); IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 15-2-803 (2007); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/2-6 (West 2007); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-2-12.1
(West 2007); IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.535 (West 2007); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-513 (2007); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 381.280 (West 2007); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 946 (2007); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-803
(2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.2803 (West 2007); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.2-803 (West 2007);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 91-1-25 (West 2007); MO. ANN. STAT. § 461.054 (West 2007); MONT. CODE ANN. §
72-2-813 (2007); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2354 (2007); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41 B (West 2007); N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 3B:7-5 to 7-7 (West 2007); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-803 (West 2007); N.Y. EST. POWERS &
TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.6 (McKinney 2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 31A-3 TO -12 (West 2007); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 30.1-10-03 (2007); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.19 (West 2007); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 231
(West 2007); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 112.455 TO .555 (West 2007); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 8801-
8815 (West 2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 33-1.1-1 TO 33-1.1-16 (2007); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-803 (2007);
2007]
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are not a new phenomenon, there is remarkable variation among the statutes
dealing with the issue. Some of the common differences include the type of
killing required by the statute, whether a conviction is necessary, and the
property covered by the statute.22 By and large, the act of killing must be
intentional, unjustifiable, felonious, and in some states, there must be a
23conviction. In other words, the killing that leads to disinheritance must be
an unambiguously egregious act. The statutes set a very high bar before
disinheriting the presumptive heir and that bar, once set, is very firm. Two
aspects of the slayer statutes are of particular interest in assessing the balance
between decedent's particular intent and society's collective judgment of
public policy.
First, of the 48 jurisdictions with slayer statutes, only Louisiana24 and
Wisconsin 25 statutorily provide for the possibility of the slayer nevertheless
receiving the inheritance. Louisiana with its civil law origins follows the civil
law tradition of unworthy successors.26 Among those deemed unworthy to
succeed to the decedent's property are those convicted of the intentional
killing or attempted killing of the decedent as well as those judicially
determined to have participated in the same. If the otherwise unworthy
successor can prove a reconciliation with the decedent, the successor will not
be declared unworthy and can therefore inherit. Reconciliation appears to be
possible only with cases of attempted murder, where the victim and heir would
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-2-803 (2007); TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-1-106 (West 2007); TEX. PROB. CODE
ANN. § 41(d) (Vernon 2007); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-803 (West 2007); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 551(6)
(2007); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-401 to -415 (West 2007); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.84.010 to 11.84.900
(West 2007); W.VA. CODE ANN. § 42-4-2 (West 2007); WiS. STAT. ANN. §§ 852.01(2m), 854.14 (West
2007); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2-14-101 2007).
21. Neither Massachusetts nor New Hampshire has a statute, but each has case law precedent to
prevent a killer from inheriting. See Slocum v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 139 N.E. 816 (Mass. 1923) and Kelley
v. State, 196 A.2d 68 (N.H. 1963). Maryland takes an interesting bifurcated approach, relying on case law
for the slayer, but essentially barring the slayer's issue from inheriting by statute. See Price v. Hitaffer, 165
A. 470 (1933); Cook v. Grierson, 845 A.2d 1231 (2004); and MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-209
(West 2007).
22. For example, the Arkansas statute provides "Whenever a spouse shall kill... his or her spouse
... and that spouse shall be convicted of murder... the one so convicted shall not be endowed in the real
or personal estate of the decedent spouse .... " ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-11-204 (West 2007); see Michael
G. Walsh, Annotation, Homicide as Precluding Taking Under Will or By Intestacy, 25 A.L.R. 4th 787
(2007).
23. Jeffrey G. Sherman, Mercy Killing and the Right to Inherit, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 803, 848-56
(1993).
24. LA. CiV. CODE ANN. Art. 943 (2007) ("A successor shall not be declared unworthy if he proves
reconciliation with or forgiveness by the decedent.")
25. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 854.14(6) (West 2007).
26. LA, ClV. CODE ANN. Art. 943 (2007); see Anne-Marie E. Rhodes, Abandoning Parents Under
Intestacy: Where We Are, Where We Need to Go, 27 IND. L. REV. 517,530 (1994).
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have the time and opportunity to reconcile after the failed attempt.
Appearances can be deceiving.
Wisconsin's statute contains unique provisions that push the timeframe
of reconciliation in the other direction. If the decedent's will makes specific
reference to the Wisconsin slayer statute and provides that it is not to apply,
then the slayer may receive property from the decedent. The Wisconsin
statute thus effectively allows a potential murder victim to fully anticipate her
killing and to be reconciled in advance to the killer and the killing. This
unusual provision may be aimed at mercy killings,28 but vulnerable victims of
domestic violence may also be within its reach.
In addition, the Wisconsin statute allows the court, on its own, to vary the
statutory disposition of property based on the "factual situation created by the
killing" if the judge determines that the decedent's wishes would best be
carried out by another disposition. 29 This discretion represents a remarkable
shift in power between the legislature and the judge, as well as between the
legislature and the individual decedent. It underscores that the dominant
theory underlying the Wisconsin slayer statute is the particular intent of the
individual decedent, and not society's collective judgment of public policy.
Like most of the adultery statutes, the Louisiana and Wisconsin slayer
statutes provide for the particularized intent of the decedent, whether
specifically stated or proved by conduct, to prevail over the statute's general
presumed intent. The theory underlying the slayer statutes in most
jurisdictions, however, encompasses more than the presumed intent of the
slain decedent. The majority reflects also a collective sense of public policy
clearly set against killing, whether based on respect for life, notions of social
cohesion, respect for rule of law, deterrence or other concerns. 30 Thus if the
slayer has met the high threshold for disinheritance, that act in virtually all
jurisdictions is an absolute bar, regardless of the decedent's particular intent.
The second interesting aspect of the slayer statutes in assessing the
balance between a decedent's particular intent and society's collective
27. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 854.14(6)(b) (West 2007). I have often wondered about the professional
responsibility of an attorney who drafts such a specific provision for a client. For a discussion of some
other ethical issues arising in the context of estate planning, see Charles M. Bennett, Frontiers in Ethics:
The Estate Lawyer's Duty of Loyalty and Confidentiality to the Fiduciary Client: Examining the Past to
Make Wise Choices Now and in the Future, 33 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 807 (2007).
28. See Sherman, supra note 23, at 876; see also 2 Wis. PROB. LAW & PRAc. § 15:9, n. 17 (8th ed.)
("The most likely use of a waiver would be in a situation of assisted suicide.").
29. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 854.14(6)(a) (West 2007).
30. Hill, supra note I1, at 348-51 (discussing the philosophical debate on the law's relevance to
private morality (say spousal misconduct) compared to public morality (say spousal murder) and stating
that despite deeply held divisions on those issues, all seem to agree there is a sufficient degree of
"intolerance, indignation, and disgust," a "strength of belief," regarding murder.).
20071
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judgment is that at least six statutes specifically address the issue of extending
the slayer's disinheritance to others. 3' Evenly divided, three provide that the
slayer's issue can inherit, 32 while three provide that they cannot. 33 This split
reflects the ambiguous dual theory of the slayer statute. The presumed intent
of a slain decedent seems clear with respect to the killer, but is less so, say,
regarding the slayer's children, that is, the decedent's innocent grandchildren.
On the other hand, the public policy theory is concerned with the act and
actor, not other recipients. From a larger perspective, each slayer statute
generally holds one paradigm in mind - the murderous beneficiary - and deals
decisively to bar inheritance by that beneficiary. What to do next is more
nuanced and messy, and neither theory of decedent's intent nor public policy
leads conclusively to a legislative pronouncement. The uncertainty these
slayer statutes display highlights a structural concern, that is, who should
decide the actual recipients of property and on what basis.
Whether more legislatures, once having spotted an issue, can move from
pronouncement of objective rules for all cases to a grant of discretion for some
more nuanced cases is itself an interesting question. The following discussion
on disinheritance statutes based on abandonment or abuse may provide some
additional insight into this larger question.
TI. STATUTORY BARS TO INHERITANCE: ABANDONMENT AND ABUSE
A. Abandonment of Spouse or Child
Spouse and children are primary heirs in all jurisdictions; the familial
relationship is key. At common law, that relationship involved affirmative
legal obligations, most importantly, the duty of a husband to support his wife
and children. 34 Abandonment of those duties or that family was not a specific
concern of the inheritance statutes. Today at least nine states35 have statutes
31. CAL. PROB. CODE § 250(b)(1), 21110 (West 2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-1-5(c) (West 2007);
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. Art. 946(B) (2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31A-4(2) (West 2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 33-1.1-2 (2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-402 (West 2007). In addition, Maryland, while without a direct
slayer statute, does essentially extend the disinheritance to the slayer's issue by its statutory definition of
issue. See supra note 21.
32. Those states are Georgia, Louisiana, and North Carolina. See supra note 31.
33. Those states are California, Rhode Island, and Virginia. See supra note 31.
34. See Gregory, supra note 19, at 69-70; see, e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442
("The husband is bound to provide his wife necessaries by law ... ").
35. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-436(g) (West 2007); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-2-15 (West 2007);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.2801(2)(e) (West 2007); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 474.140 (West 2007); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 560:18 (2007); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.2(a) McKinney 2007); N.C.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31 A-I (West 2007); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2106(a) (West 207); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 64.1-16.3 (West 2007). Otherjurisdictions may also acknowledge spousal abandonment. See, e.g., HAW.
REv. STAT. § 533-9 (2007); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 191, § 15, ch. 209, § 36 (West 2007).
[Vol. 33
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concerning spousal abandonment while at least eleven states36 have statutes
concerning child abandonment.
1. Spousal abandonment
The nine spousal abandonment statutes may be seen as vestiges of the
adultery statutes. In fact, Missouri and North Carolina are the only two states
that have both, and their provisions on adultery and on abandonment are found
in the same section.3 7 Like the bar for adultery, the bar of inheritance in
spousal abandonment is soft because as long as the spouses have resumed
their duties at the time of death, for most of these statutes prior abandonment
is specifically irrelevant. The intent of the decedent presumed by the
legislature from the original act of abandonment once again yields to the intent
of the specific decedent inferred by the legislature from that decedent's
subsequent conduct. Public policy concerns over issues of spousal
abandonment today, just like adultery, are not significant enough to outweigh
the decedent's particular intent inferred from subsequent actions.
2. Child Abandonment
The abandonment of parental obligations owed to a child is a much
newer addition to statutory disinheritance. Eleven jurisdictions today have
specific statutes on child abandonment for inheritance purposes.
The first was enacted in 1927 in North Carolina in response to a court
decision confirming an inheritance by an abandoning father.3 8 It was followed
by a New York statute in 1941, and then more than four decades later, in
1984, Pennsylvania became the third state to enact a child abandonment
statute barring inheritance.39 Since 1984, there have been eight more states
with statutes disinheriting parents who abandon their children.' Nine of those
36. See CONN. GEN STAT. ANN. § 45a-439(a)(1) (West 2007); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/2-6.5
(West 2007); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.033(1) (West 2007); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 3-112
(West 2007); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.4(a) (McKinney 2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
31A-2 (West 2007); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.10(B) (West 2007); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 112.047
(West 2007); 20 PA CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2106(b) (West 2007); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-114 (2007); VA.
CODE ANN. § 64.1-16.3(B) (West 2007). For an excellent analysis of the issues behind such statutes, see
Paula A. Monopoli, "Deadbeat Dads": Should Support and Inheritance Be Linked?, 49 U. MIAMI L. REV.
257 (1994).
37. MO. ANN. STAT. § 474.140 (West 2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31A-1 (West 2007).
38. N.C. PUBL. LAWS ch. 231 (1927), in response to Avery v. Brantley, 131 S.E. 721 (N.C. 1926);
see Rhodes, supra note 26, at 532-533.
39. 1941 N.Y. LAWS ch. 89, p. 1 7 3 n.; 20 PA CONS. STAT. § 2106(b) (West 2007).
40. Those jurisdictions are Connecticut, Illinois, Kentucky, Maryland, Ohio, Oregon, South
Carolina, and Virginia. See supra note 36. For this purpose, I am not including jurisdictions that have
enacted Uniform Probate Code sec 2-114-type statutes regarding paternity that could arguably be used to
2007]
HeinOnline  -- 33 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 983 2007
OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW [Vol. 33
bar the inheritance,4 but like the spousal abandonment and spousal adultery
statutes, the child abandonment bar is soft. If the abandoning parent returns
and resumes care, then the statutory bar is inapplicable. Also, in some
jurisdictions disinheritance occurs only if the child is a minor at the time of
death,42 perhaps reflecting a legislative belief that the collective judgment of
presumed intent can only apply when the child cannot act. The decedent who
was an abandoned child, once testamentary capacity is achieved, now bears
the burden of particularizing her intent.
Child abandonment in the context of a presumed intent is not the parallel
of spousal abandonment. There the reconciliation is between two fully
participating, autonomous, consenting adults, and hence a sense of the parties'
intent seems fairly inferable and general public policy properly yields to their
intent. With respect to child abandonment, however, the parties are in vastly
different legal positions. Here, the "reconciliation" is not between two equals,
rather there is the resumption of legal duty owed by one party to the other. By
definition, a child lacks testamentary capacity,43 and hence only the returning
parent's intent may be inferred. Because in the calculus of who can express
testamentary intent a child is excluded, the legal theory underlying these
statutes may not be the particularized intent of the child decedent. Rather, the
theory may be a combination of a generalized deemed intent of any child who
disinherit abandoning parents. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 43-8-48 (2007); ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.114 (2007);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2114 (2007); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-114 (West 2007); HAW. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 560:2-114 (LexisNexis 2007); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-2-109 (2007); ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18-a, § 2-109 (2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.2114(4) (West 2007); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
474.060(2) (West 2007); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-124(2) (2007); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2309(2) (2007);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-114(C) (West 2007); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-09(2) (2007); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 29A-2-114 (2007); TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-2-105 (West 2007); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-114
(West 2007).
41. Those states, but not including Illinois and South Carolina, are listed supra note 36.
42. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.10 (West 2007): "a parent who has abandoned his
minor child who subsequently dies intestate as a minor shall not inherit .... " See Heyward D. Armstrong,
In re Estate of Lunsford and Statutory Ambiguity: Trying to Reconcile Child Abandonment and the
Intestate Succession Act, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1149 (2003) (discussing the interpretation of "child" in the North
Carolina abandonment statute as meaning a child of any age, and not only a minor child).
43. There is some variation among the states as to the age of testamentary capacity. Most
jurisdictions use the age of 18, but some do not. Georgia, for example, "still" sets the age at 14. See Mary
F. Radford and F. Skip Sugarman, Georgia's New Probate Code, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 605, 671 (1997),
who state: "New Code section 53-2-10(a) still allows a testator to make a valid will in Georgia at the age
of fourteen." That "still" may be even older than Georgia's recent revision of their probate code. The civil
law required a male to be at least 14 and a female at least 12 in order to execute a will. See 2 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *497.
In some jurisdictions, the age may be lower if another triggering event has occurred prior to the
stated age. For example, marriage, emancipation, or joining the armed services may waive the statutory
age requirement. See, e.g., TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 57 (Vernon 2007).
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has been abandoned," coupled with a general public policy of privacy, that is,
noninterference in family matters except in egregious circumstances. As long
as the family is intact and the parents do not willfully fail to meet their legal
obligation of support, the particular intent of the child is irrelevant. Two
jurisdictions, Illinois45 and South Carolina,46 provide for a different
consequence, where the judge is to determine the extent to which the parent's
abandonment should affect the parent's presumptive inheritance.
The two statutes that grant a judge discretion to determine the impact of
the child abandonment are particularly noteworthy and may take a different
perspective on a child's particular intent. Like the Wisconsin slayer statute,47
this legislative grant of discretion to the judge shifts power from the
legislature to the judge, and in a limited sense to the child decedent. In doing
so, it affirms the centrality of this particular decedent's situation, even though
a child, and not a generic template. An individualized custom determination
is to be made based on the actual events of the particular individuals before
the judge. By shifting from an objective rule to judicial discretion in the
circumstances of child abandonment, the legal system may be underscoring
the public policy of protecting a particularly vulnerable population.
44. This generalized deemed intent of a child who has been abandoned is problematic. "It may seem
intuitively correct that an abused or neglected child would not want his abusive or neglectful parent to
inherit, but that intuition may not be correct." Richard Lewis Brown, Undeserving Heirs?: The Case of
the "Terminated" Parent, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 547,561 (2006), noting studies that show children continue
to bond with parents who have abused or abandoned them. A child's desire to please, and not to be
abandoned, but to be accepted, is very strong. It may therefore well be that a child who has been abandoned
will nevertheless wish the abandoning parent to be included. The question then becomes which is the
relevant intent, that of this particular child decedent or the substituted intent of our collective judgment.
This conflict comes up in other contexts as well. See, e.g, Diane Geraghty, Ethical Issues in the Legal
Representation of Children in Illinois: Roles, Rules and Reforms, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 289 (1998),
discussing the difficult ethical questions an attorney faces when appointed to act as both an attorney and
guardian ad litem for a minor child.
45. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/2-6.5 (West 2007) ("a parent who ... has willfully deserted the
minor or dependent child shall not receive any property, benefit, or other interest... unless and until a court
of competent jurisdiction makes a determination as to the effect on the deceased minor or dependent child
of the parent's ... willful desertion ... and allows a reduced benefit or other interest that the parent was
to receive by virtue of the death of the minor or dependent child, as the interests of justice require.").
46. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-114 (2007) ("Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if the parents
of the deceased would be the intestate heirs .... upon the motion of either parent or any other party...,
the probate court may deny or limit either or both parent's entitlement for a share of the proceeds if the
court determines, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the parent or parents fail to reasonably provide
support for the decedent .... ").
47. See discussion supra at notes 27-29.
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B. Abuse
Another statutory bar to inheritance is abuse of the decedent. These
specific statutes on abuse48 distinguish based on the victim, that is, abuse of
a child and abuse of an adult or elderly decedent, as well as on the nature of
the abuse, that is, physical abuse and financial exploitation. Some
jurisdictions specifically bar inheritance if the presumptive heir has abused the
child decedent,49 while some jurisdictions bar inheritance if the presumptive
heir has abused the adult or elderly decedent."
The triggering conduct of abuse varies among these jurisdictions, some
including financial exploitation as well as physical abuse.5 Like the slayer
statutes, some abuse statutes require a conviction for the abuse,52 while others
only require clear and convincing evidence of abuse.53 This echo of the slayer
statute carries more than a passing reference. Oregon includes an abuser with
the slayer statute and Pennsylvania proposes to do the same.54 This joining of
slayer and abuser has a certain logic to it, perhaps similar to Louisiana's
murder and attempted murder in its unworthy successor provision. Taking a
closer look, however, the joining of slayer and abuser raises a concern.
Oregon defines an abuser not only in the obvious terms of physical abuse
or neglect but also in terms of financial abuse. Moreover, Oregon requires
a conviction for such abuse within five years of the decedent's death.56
Financial abuse of the elderly is estimated to affect millions of people
annually.57 The hard consequence of this financial loss on a vulnerable
48. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 259 (West 2007); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/2-6.2 (West 2007);
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 8-801(e) (West 2007), EST. &TRUSTS § 3-111 (West 2007); OR. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 112.455-112.465 (West 2007); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2106(b) (West 2007).
49. See MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 3-111 (West 2007); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2106(b)
(West 2007).
50. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 259 (West 2007); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/2-6.2 (West 2007);
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. L.Aw § 8-801(e) (West 2007); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 112.455-112.465 (West
2007).
51. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 259(a)(1) (West 2007); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 112.455(1) (West
2007).
52. Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Oregon require a conviction. See supra note 48.
53. See e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 259 (West 2007).
54. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 112.465 (West 2007); see H.B. 1970, 189th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess.
(Pa. 2005).
55. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 112.455(1) (West 2007).
56. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 112.457 (West 2007).
57. Financial abuse or exploitation of the elderly is significant, although "no one knows precisely
how many older Americans are being abused, neglected, or exploited." See NATIONAL CENTER ON ELDER
ABUSE, FACT SHEET: ELDER ABUSE PREVALENCE AND INCIDENCE (2005). Some studies estimate that only
one in 25 cases of financial exploitation is reported, suggesting that there may be as many as 5 million
victims a year. Id. For a downside application of technology, see Eric L. Carlson, Phishingfor Elderly
Victims: As Elderly Migrate to the Internet Fraudulent Schemes Targeting Them Follow, 14 ELDER L.J.
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population is quite real. Nevertheless, equating intentional killing with
financial abuse seems lopsided in theory if not in statutory efficiency. The
clear message of the slayer statutes, even allowing for their variation, is a
bright line of societal condemnation of the act, underscored by a denial of the
slayer's unjust enrichment. The Oregon statute loses that clarity with the
addition of financial abuse and further reduces the singular focus on the
reprehensibility of the offending act by allowing the mere passage of time to
cure its consequences. Neither theory of decedent's intent or public policy
would seem to offer support.
JIl. HEIRS' MISCONDUCT IN THE CONTEXT OF SUCCESSION LAW REFORM
These limited statutory iterations on heirs' misconduct suggest that the
legislative preference for non-intervention, observable over time, continues.
There is a reactive feel to these legislative pronouncements, especially
noticeable in the patchwork of misconduct required, the underlying theories,
and approaches to consequences. Unlike the striking similarity of heirship
tables over time and borders, these disinheritance statutes generally lack
certainty and clarity of purpose and vision. Nevertheless, they offer, sotto
voce, a conversation among the three actors--decedent, legislator, and
judge-in determining who should receive the decedent's property and who
should decide. There are two threads to this conversation.
The first thread of the conversation concerns the misconduct, dividing
easily between murder and the others. The near universality of some version
of a slayer statute attests to its strong public policy underpinnings, which
traditionally trump the individual decedent's intent. Murder is an extreme and
egregious act that threatens the safety and stability of all, and a murder that
leads directly to a pecuniary gain, fixed by statute, for the murderer is
destructive of legal order.58 It simply cannot be tolerated. A decedent's
particular intent is irrelevant. 9 This is not a conversation, it is a monologue.
Society's interest drowns out the decedent's particular voice.
423, 428 (2007). For a comprehensive overview of the incidence and pervasiveness of elder abuse, see
NATIONAL CENTER ON ELDER ABUSE, THE NATIONAL ELDER ABUSE INCIDENCE STUDY (Sept. 1998),
available at http://www.aoa.gov/eldfam/Elder.Rights/Elder_Abuse/AbuseReportFull.pdf.
58. Violent crime rates have been declining since 1994 with the lowest level reached in 2005. For
a significant number of victims, there is a family link between the victim and the slayer and hence to the
inheritance. From 1976 to 2004, about 11% of all murder victims were determined to have been killed by
an intimate; for women victims the rate is 18%. In 2002, 43% of murder victims were related to or
acquainted with their assailants. Two-thirds of murders of children under the age of five were committed
by a parent or other family member. BUREAU OF JUSTICE, CRIME CHARACTERISTICS: SUMMARY FINDINGS
(Apr. 2007), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/cvictc.htm.
59. Except for Louisiana and Wisconsin, see discussion supra at notes 24-30.
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The other types of misconduct lack this strength and clarity. Their range
is limited in scope (adultery, abandonment and abuse) and in legislative
concern (less than a third of states). This misconduct is of a lesser stature. It
is of general concern but is neither a direct threat to society nor the direct
cause of the decedent's death. Unlike the act of murder, these involve not an
isolated act but generally a course of conduct over time. Theoretically this
time allows the aggrieved party time to evaluate, perhaps even reconcile, and
then set forth her own dispositive wishes. If those wishes include forgiveness,
the forfeiture statutes, by their definitional requisites, are generally not
triggered. For this lesser misconduct, there is a conversation. It is a dialogue
between the decedent and the legislature, begun by the legislature by culling
out this misconduct, but finished by the decedent. The judge is merely the go
between.
The second thread of conversation concerns the roles of all three
actors--decedent, legislator and judge-and registers in the context of
succession law reform. The two broad areas of succession law reform focus
on the demographics of changing families' and the realities of modem
property.6' The Uniform Probate Code moves beyond the historic paradigm
of one-husband-one-wife-for-life and recognizes the modem reality of blended
families. It provides, for example, an inheritance scheme based on whether
the decedent and the surviving spouse have some, all, or no children in
common.62 Similarly, the proliferation of property and its new forms of titling
have revolutionized the passing of property at death, often by privatizing its
passing, and thus, bypassing the probate process completely.6" Both of these
major expressions of succession law reform fundamentally recognize that a
one size fits all approach to inheritance no longer reflects the realities of
modem life.
60. Earlier in the symposium, the Restatement position on children of assisted reproduction and how
they should be treated for purposes of inheritance and will and trust distributions was discussed. Lawrence
W. Waggoner, Class Gifts Under the Restatement (Third) of Property, 33 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 995 (2007).
There are other equally compelling issues in the meaning of family today. See, e.g., E. Gary Spitko, An
Accrual/Multi-Factor Approach to Intestate Inheritance Rights for Unmarried Committed Partners, 81
OR. L. REv. 255 (2002); see also Ralph C. Brashier, Consanguinity, Sibling Relationships, and the Default
Rules of Inheritance Law: Reshaping Half-blood Statutes to Reflect the Evolving Family, 58 SMU L. REV.
137 (2005); Susan N. Gary, The Parent-Child Relationship Under Intestacy Statutes, 32 U. MEM. L. REV.
643 (2002).
61. The leading article is John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law
of Succession, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1108 (1984). For a more recent discussion of a next-generation issue, see
Susan N. Gary, Transfer-on-Death Deeds: The Nonprobate Revolution Continues, 41 REAL PROP. PROB.
& TR. J. 529 (2006).
62. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-102 (1990).
63. See Langbein, supra note 61, at 1108-15.
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This recognition may similarly be audible in the newer disinheritance
statutes. When a legislature moves from an objective rule to a grant of
discretion, it essentially recognizes that a single rule no longer works. In this
view, the legislative function becomes two tiered. First, the legislature must
identify the particular misconduct it wishes to address. Second, it must locate
that misconduct between the two poles of decedent's intent and public
policy.' Virtually all legislatures have placed a decedent's murder squarely
within the realm of public policy buttressed by a legislatively presumed intent,
to the exclusion of the decedent's particular intent.6" On the other hand, the
few jurisdictions that have statutory bars for adultery generally locate that bar
within the realm of the decedent's intent by defining the misconduct in terms
of the subsequent intentional actions of the decedent and spouse.' A
legislative grant of discretion to ajudge represents a legislative determination
that the misconduct it has identified cannot be so easily located for inheritance
purposes. The proper resolution of the legislative concern requires a
particularized determination, and that determination cannot, as a practical
matter, be made by the legislature, but in the judgment of the legislature it is
not to be made wholly by the decedent, either. The judge, then, is asked to
actively join the conversation in order to balance decedent's intent and public
policy under the circumstances.
From a centuries' old tradition based on the certainty and stability of
nondiscretionary objective rules, this legislative grant of subjective discretion
over the disposition of a decedent's property is extraordinary. One would
expect, therefore, that the misconduct that causes the legislature first to
override its long standing reluctance to create a statutory disinheritance, and
then to take the additional and extraordinary step of granting discretion to a
probatejudge, must be very sensitive. It is not surprising, therefore, that child
abandonment and mercy killings are two circumstances where the competing
policies of decedent's intent and public policy raise especially difficult issues.
Childhood from 0 to 18 encompasses the broadest range of human
physical and intellectual growth and development. Yet legally for inheritance
purposes, a child, whether of 17 months or 17 years, is deemed to lack
testamentary capacity and hence unable to form testamentary intent.67
Similarly, a child's statements or actions are legally irrelevant for the
disposition of the child's property. By allowing a judge to consider the
64. There may well be a multiplicity of concerns, but for purposes of this paper the primary
perspective is the bilateral tension between the individual decedent's particular intent and society's
collective judgment in light of the misconduct. See Gary, Laws to Changing Families, supra note 5, at 6-
13.
65. See discussion supra at notes 20-33.
66. See discussion supra at notes 13-19.
67. See discussion supra at notes 43-44.
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abandonment in light of this particular child, the child's intent may emerge
and be honored. Whether or not a judge can discern a particular intent for the
child, the judge must then balance that intent, particular or generic, against a
matrix of public policies that include protecting a vulnerable population, the
legal duty of a parent to support a child, privacy in family matters, respect for
the rule of law, and institutional efficiency. The lifelong abandonment of a
13 year old child decedent differs greatly from the 13 month abandonment of
an almost 18 year old child decedent. Now two legislatures statutorily
recognize that reality and allow for a more nuanced approach by substituting
the closer voice of the judge for its own remote pronouncement.
Mercy killing similarly presents a difficult issue today. It also offers a
striking contrast to the assumed slayer statute paradigm of the murderous
beneficiary. In the celebrated 19th-century case of Riggs versus Palmer, a
grandson kills his grandfather in order to receive his inheritance.68 In the
absence of a controlling New York statute, the court upholds the
disinheritance based on the equitable principle that a wrongdoer shall not
profit by his wrongful act. The near universal adoption of a slayer statute
confirms the soundness of this judgment. On the other hand, consider the case
of a husband married more than 60 years to his adored wife. 69 Now suffering
terribly from a terminal illness, she begs her husband to end her suffering. He
reluctantly and sadly, but knowingly and intentionally, acquiesces. For some
people, these two killers, the grandson and the husband, do not occupy the
same moral position. By granting discretion to a judge, the legislature
acknowledges the possibility that these two killings can, and perhaps should,
be differentiated and have a different impact on the disposition of the
decedent's property. For two jurisdictions, the conversation is allowed to
continue past the mere fact of the act.7" The final word belongs to the judge,
who now must balance society's collective concerns against killing with the
particular facts of the case.
These disinheritance statutes, originally limited to a single voice, now
encompass a fuller range of sound.
IV. CONCLUSION
The changing landscape of modem families and property necessitates an
ongoing reconsideration of intestate statutes for the devolution of property.
Concerns about an heir's misconduct have historically only been modestly
68. 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889).
69. For a similar, real-life scenario, see Sherman, supra note 23, at 804.
70. The Wisconsin statute goes even further by also providing that a decedent can opt out of the
slayer statute, thereby removing both judge and legislator from the conversation. The sole voice belongs
to the decedent. See discussion supra, at notes 27-28.
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addressed within intestacy, and that remains true today. Nevertheless, recent
disinheritance statutes have moved beyond the tradition of an objective rule
to granting ajudge discretion in certain sensitive circumstances. This legisla-
tive grant of discretion is extraordinary. It may mark the beginning of a
subjective approach in the disposition of intestate property, one that in
balancing the intent of the decedent against society's general public policy in
very limited circumstances of heirs' misconduct places a thumb on the scale
in favor of the decedent's particular intent. For a system premised on the
importance of decedent's intent, it is a step in the right direction and bears
watching.
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